In the bustling metropolis of Chennai, where palm trees sway in the coastal breeze, a bomb threat to 13 schools sent shockwaves through the community. The menacing email, sent on February 8th, turned out to be a hoax, but its origins have sparked a broader conflict between privacy rights and law enforcement.

The Tamil Nadu police traced the message to a Proton Mail account, the encrypted email service based in Switzerland. Unable to compel the company to reveal the sender’s IP address and stymied by Interpol, the Tamil Nadu authorities put in a request to India’s central Ministry of Electronics and Information Technology (MeitY) to block Proton Mail access throughout the country.

On Friday, February 15th, that request was granted. MeitY issued an order to block the encrypted service, instructing the Department of Telecommunications to carry out the enforcement. This will likely entail delisting Proton Mail from Indian app stores, though the website was still accessible at the time of writing.

It’s not the first time the Indian government has clashed with Proton AG, the Swiss firm behind Proton Mail and Proton VPN. In 2022, Proton removed VPN servers from India after a controversial mandate requiring providers to log user data.

In response to the Proton Mail ban, Proton AG is attempting dialogue. “We are currently working to resolve this situation and are investigating how we can best work together with the Indian authorities,” a spokesperson told Hindustan Times. “We understand the urgency of the situation and are completely clear that our services are not to be used for illegal purposes.“

Yet Proton Mail’s hands are tied by Swiss privacy laws. “Proton cannot answer directly to foreign law enforcement authorities,” the company explained, “but Swiss authorities may assist foreign authorities with requests, provided they are valid under international assistance procedures and determined to be in compliance with Swiss law.”

This incident exemplifies tensions between digital privacy and anti-crime efforts. India has targeted encrypted services before, blocking apps like Threema and Wickr last year. The government also aims to weaken WhatsApp’s end-to-end encryption, though technical details are murky.

Proton concurs that banning its service misses the mark: “We condemn a potential block as a misguided measure that only serves to harm ordinary people. Blocking access…is an ineffective and inappropriate response.” If the perpetrators reside abroad, “it will not prevent cybercriminals from sending threats with another email service.”